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ABSTRACT
It is rare to find an environmental law development or ‘innovation’ announced or
celebrated without some discussion of its transferability. Discourses of diffusion are
becoming increasingly central to the way that we develop, communicate and frame
environmental law ideas. And yet, this significant dimension of environmental law
practice seems to have outgrown existing conceptual scaffolding and scholarly vocab-
ularies. The concept, and intentionally unfamiliar terminology, of ‘contagious law-
making’ creates a space for both fleshing out, and problematizing, the phenomenon
of the dynamic and multi-directional transfer of environmental law ideas. This article
sets the stage for further study of the global diffusion of environmental law. It does
so by identifying the phenomenon of contagious lawmaking and by making explicit
some of the terminological and methodological challenges implicated in its study.
The article draws on narratives of the ‘global’ diffusion of environmental impact as-
sessment, cited as ‘the most widely adopted environmental management tool in the
world’.
KEYWORDS : Diffusion, transplants, environmental law methodologies, environmen-
tal policy transfer, environmental impact assessment, environmental law scholarship
1. INTRODUCTION
New Zealand’s recognition of the legal personhood of Te Awa Tupua
(the Whanganui River)1 is celebrated as a revolutionary and transferable
phenomenon.2
Ghana develops a corporate environmental performance ratings program to re-
flect Ghanaian concepts of the environment, using an Indonesian model.3
A rights-based climate change litigation victory in Pakistan4 is proclaimed a
model for other jurisdictions.5
* Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia (affolder@allard.ubc.ca)
1 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act, 2017 No 7, s 14 (New Zealand).
2 David Boyd, The Rights of Nature: A Legal Revolution That Could Save the World (ECW Press 2017).
3 Adwoa Darko-Mensah, ‘Can Environmental Performance Rating Programmes Succeed in Africa?: An
Evaluation of Ghana’s AKOBEN Project’ (2013) 24 Management Envtl Quality 599, 600.
4 Ashgar Leghari v Federation Federation of Pakistan, WP No 25501/2015 (Lahore High Court, 4 September
2015, Pakistan).
5 Jacqueline Peel and Hari Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation’ (2018) 7 TEL 37, 377.
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work
is properly cited.
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Ecuador’s Recognition of ‘Rights of Nature’6 emerge from a project to con-
struct a transposable paradigm of constitutional rights.7
A Global Judicial Institute for the Environment8 is created to share and trans-
fer judicial experiences in applying and enforcing environmental laws.
A multilateral treaty on persistent organic pollutants9 ‘borrows’ a Swedish con-
cept of ‘sunset periods’ for toxic chemicals.10
A group of climate legislation ‘advocates’ seek to advance the spread of climate le-
gislation in Costa Rica, China, Columbia, Nigeria, Peru, Mexico, and Micronesia.11
The World Bank draws on strategic environmental ‘pilot programs’ in coun-
tries including Malawi and Sierre Leone to promote the practice of legal model
transfers.12
Commentators suggest the EU earns climate law leader status precisely by cre-
ating models capable of transplantation elsewhere.13
Environmental law is on the move. This reality is not lost on scholars who, using di-
verse discourses of transplantation, spread, transmission, diffusion, cross-fertilisation,
dissemination, and even impregnation, document multiple manifestations of a similar
idea—environmental law ideas travel. Indeed, it is rare to find an environmental law
development or ‘innovation’ announced or celebrated without some discussion of its
transferability. Discourses of diffusion are becoming increasingly central to the way
that we develop, communicate, debate and frame environmental law ideas. This mat-
ters for both environmental law scholarship and for the practice of environmental law.
The rapid expansion and multi-level nature of these developments suggest that
this increasingly significant dimension of environmental law practice has outgrown
existing conceptual scaffolding and scholarly vocabularies. As a result, the visual field
through which these developments are contemplated and analyzed is artificially nar-
row and risks obscuring the complexity of legal mobility on view. The concept, and
intentionally unfamiliar terminology, of ‘contagious lawmaking’ creates a space for
both fleshing out, and problematising, the phenomenon of the dynamic and multi-
directional transfer of environmental law ideas. Such transfers are not restricted to
6 2008 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, pt 2, Ch 7, arts 71–74 (Ecuador).
7 Maria Akchurin, ‘Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and
Environmental Protection in Ecuador’ (2015) 40 L & Soc Inq 937, 944–8.
8 International Union for the Conservation of Nature, ‘Global Judicial Institute on the Environment’
(IUCN webpage accessed 18 June 2018) <https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-envir
onmental-law/our-work/global-judicial-institute-environment>.
9 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2256 UNTS 119; 40 ILM 532 (2001).
10 Jonathan Wiener, ‘Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of
Global Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 Ecology LQ 1295, 1297.
11 Michal Nachmany and others, ‘The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change
Legislation in 66 Countries’ (LSE Research Online Report 2014) <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63656/>
accessed 20 March 2019, xii.
12 World Bank, Strategic Environmental Assessment in Policy and Sector Reform (World Bank 2011) 2.
13 Kati Kulovesi, ‘Climate Change in the EU External Relations: Please Follow my Example (or I Might
Force You to)’ in Elisa Morgera (ed), The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and
International Law Dimensions (CUP 2012) 115.
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the spread of ideas and models across national borders. Rather, they permeate supra-
national14 and sub-national lawmaking processes,15 transnational legal orders,16 pri-
vate environmental governance,17 sites of Indigenous lawmaking,18 legal cultures and
traditions,19 judicial discourse20 and international organisational practice.21
The task of describing the extent and significance of contagious environmental
lawmaking is not an article-length endeavour.22 This article serves as an exploratory
attempt to identify the phenomenon of contagious environmental lawmaking and to
make explicit some of the terminological and methodological challenges this practice
poses for scholars. While acknowledging that potential labels may seem frustratingly
inadequate for what is far from a singular phenomenon, this article suggests that the
language of ‘contagious environmental lawmaking’ might effectively define a space
for discussing the ways in which legal ideas spread, and are being spread, across di-
verse jurisdictions and sites of lawmaking. The article pivots around the story of
what has been labelled ‘the international spread of . . . the most widely adopted en-
vironmental management tool across the world’—environmental impact assessment
(EIA).23 The dominant discursive patterns surrounding EIA’s spread offer a launch-
ing pad for an exploration of the terminological and methodological impediments to
seeing and understanding the practices through which legal ideas move.
Critically engaging with the phenomenon of contagious lawmaking offers an op-
portunity to consider anew environmental law’s place-based and culture-based ful-
crums. The very practices of contagious lawmaking demand interrogation of the
implications of thinking about environmental law ideas as inherently transferable and
transposable. The ambition of this article, and the reason for its focus on terminology
and scholarly methods, is to encourage such questioning to emerge in a way that is
attentive to what is at stake in defining and describing these practices and, in so
doing, in both naming law’s past and prescribing its future.
14 Sanja Bogojevic, Emissions Trading Schemes: Markets, States and Law (Hart 2013).
15 Sofie Bouteligier, Cities, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance. Spaces of Innovation, Places of
Leadership (Routledge 2013) 2.
16 Terrence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transnational Legal Orders (CUP 2015).
17 Jodi Short, ‘Transplanting Law in a Globalized World: Private Transnational Regulation and the Legal
Transplant Paradigm’ in Francesca Bignami and David Zaring (eds), Comparative Law and Regulation:
Understanding the Global Regulatory Process (Edward Elgar 2016).
18 Akchurin (n 7) 944–8.
19 See Scotford’s invocation of ‘internal’ legal cultures. Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the
Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart 2017) 19.
20 Peel and Osofsky thus contemplate existing rights-based judgments as offering a ‘model or inspiration’
for climate litigation decisions in ‘other jurisdictions’: Peel and Osofsky (n 5) 37.
21 Alogna suggests that the ‘oblique circulation of legal models, through means of, or directed by supra-
national institutions, have largely replaced the one between individual states.’ Ivano Alogna, ‘The
Circulation of the Model of Sustainable Development: Tracing the Path in a Comparative Law
Perspective’ in Voker Mauerhofer (ed), Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development: Horizontal and Sectorial
Policy Issues (Springer 2016) 13, 21.
22 This article is thus a small piece of a larger project. Its contribution focuses on problematizing scholarly
approaches to naming, and engaging with, contagious lawmaking. The larger project problematizes the
practices of contagious lawmaking themselves.
23 Tseming Yang and Robert Percival, ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ (2009) 36 Ecology
LQ 615, 627.
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2. THE ‘GLOBAL SPREAD’ OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
2.1 Dominant Narratives and Hidden Assumptions
The international spread of environmental impact assessment (EIA) is celebrated as
a landmark example of what this article identifies as contagious lawmaking. The roll-
out and uptake of EIA is cited as an important step in the development of ‘modern’
environmental law.24 Its ubiquity means that any countries that have not introduced
EIA are now seen as outliers; there are ‘probably no more than ten countries where
EIA has not been introduced, and these include countries at war as well as some of
the small island states’.25
Environmental impact assessment is a fascinating legal practice to contemplate in
a transnational context. Its very framing raises some flags about the quite distinct
ways in which it might be conceptualised, despite a common label.26 EIAs are used
around the world for assessing the types and extent of environmental impact likely
to be caused by a given human action or activity on a species, habitat, or ecosystem
(and also sometimes on the human environment). National EIA laws typically spe-
cify the circumstances under which certain prescribed projects will undergo a speci-
fied level of review before approval is granted, involving the disclosure of specific
risks, proceeding within specified time periods, and conducted by a specific agency,
as well as involving (sometimes) specified public or private participants.27 While the
focus of legal EIA regimes is heavily procedural, such a procedural focus belies the
fact that EIA serves as an entryway into deeper, substantive legal understandings of
public participation, standing, concepts of state authority, expert rule, evidentiary
standards, and wider concepts of rights and obligations in any legal system.28
A close look at some of the dominant narratives that feature in accounts of EIA’s
global spread reveals how easily passive, de-contextualised, and ahistorical interpreta-
tions of law’s movements creep into accounts of contagious lawmaking.29
24 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Solutions to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 87.
25 Arend Kolhoff and others, ‘Environmental Assessment’ in Roel Slootweg and others (eds), Biodiversity in
Environmental Assessment: Enhancing Ecosystem Services for Human Well-Being (CUP 2010) 125, 127.
26 Transnational debates about EIA and its effectiveness thus need to be grounded in the reality that EIA
can be conceived very differently in different contexts, reflecting diverse understandings of state authority,
of the division of rights and obligations, of the purpose of EIA, of what counts as public participation, and
of whom those relevant ‘publics’ might be. For a useful synthesis of many of the underlying theoretical
and conceptual debates, see Barry Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public
Participation in Resources Development’ in Donald Zillman, Alastair Lucas and George (Rock) Pring
(eds), Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in the Sustainable Development
of Mining and Natural Resources (OUP 2002) 77.
27 For a revealing look into the texts of some (quite randomly selected) national EIA laws and how they
vary in their level of detail and procedural requirements, see alternately Environment Protection
(Amendment) Act 2008, Mauritius Acts 2008, Act No 6 (Mauritius), Law of Republic of Kyrgyzstan on
Environmental Protection, 1991, 91WN0681A (Kyrgyzstan), Environmental Impact Assessment, Laws of
the Republic of Paraguay 1993, Law No 294/93 (Paraguay).
28 For an examination of the wider significance of the European Court of Justice’s rulings on the EIA
Directive, for example, see Vanessa Edwards, ‘A Review of the Court of Justice’s Case Law in Relation to
Waste and Environmental Impact Assessment, 1999-2011’ (2013) 25 JEL 515.
29 To identify these discourses, literature surveys were initiated to isolate any books or articles making refer-
ence to EIA’s spread, movement, dissemination, transfer, diffusion. Particular attention was paid to
190  Contagious Environmental Lawmaking
Identification of these narratives is not intended to disparage existing environmental
law scholarship. Rather, isolating such narratives permits awareness of the significant
hurdles and challenges implicated by the study of the movement of environmental
law in what is inherently a comparative and transnational space. Drawing attention
to narrative defaults highlights how environmental law’s ‘creation myths’ (including
its treatment of the birth and spread of EIA) develop, and are institutionalised, some-
times without a robust empirical base.
The very adoption of a ‘transnational’ lens, one that allows efforts to introduce
EIA across the globe to come into view, itself imports biases and assumptions as to
the appropriate unit of analysis. Such a lens allows us to see the movement of an
idea such as EIA as the product of ‘flows, networks, and governance assemblages’ ra-
ther than to see this movement as the work of individual people.30 Such a lens might
work well for liberal theorists and activists who are comfortable with the idea of uni-
versal models, slightly adapted ‘by giving them a local paint job’.31 But, for other
scholars, including postcolonial and anthropologically minded scholars who
emphasise historical specificity and contextual particularity, the very activity of seeing
and ‘mapping’ the diffusion of a universal idea like EIA is problematic.32 The ter-
minological and methodological traps that emerge in accounts of EIA’s spread thus
speak to the core argument of this article—that environmental law’s mobility has
outgrown the terminology and conceptual scaffolding necessary to robustly engage
with it. Building out from the example of EIA, the article moves to tackle these ter-
minological and methodological ‘traps’ head on.
2.2 Passive Accounts: A Common Sense Idea Whose Time Had Come
EIA is frequently described as one of the most ‘successful policy innovations of the
20th Century’.33 It is applauded as a ‘common sense’ approach that has now perme-
ated law in all but a handful of countries.34 Indeed, this ‘common sense’ framing is
suggested by Craik to be the reason for its near universal acceptance, as it seems clear
that ‘decisions about activities that have some likelihood of adversely affecting the
environment ought to be made in light of a comprehensive understanding of those
impacts’.35 Thus, permeating accounts of EIA’s spread is a dominant idea that EIA is
simply a good idea whose time had come.
Scholars such as Yang and Percival suggest EIA is an ‘important innovation in US
environmental law’ that has ‘been widely adopted and uploaded into international
finding examples of scholarship emerging in countries that were the recipients of EIA models and practi-
ces as well as those providing inspiration for models adopted elsewhere. This literature search included
references to EIA beyond environmental law in international law, development bank practice, and private
transnational regulation.
30 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes Of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge 2015) 106.
31 ibid 110.
32 ibid.
33 Barry Sadler, Environmental Assessment in a Changing World: Evaluating Practice to Improve Performance
(Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 1996) i.
34 Virginia Alzina, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Systems in Developing Countries: A Study of Success
and Failure in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (PhD Thesis, George Washington University 2001) 10–
12; Alastair Neil Craik, ‘Environmental Assessment: A Comparative Legal Analysis’ in Jorge Vi~nuales and
Emma Lees (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Law (OUP 2019).
35 Craik, ibid 1.
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treaties’.36 They frame EIA as a flagship example of the emergence of global environ-
mental law, and note that national responses to environmental problems have been
‘surprisingly progressive: Countries are transplanting law and regulatory policy inno-
vations of other nations, even when they have very different legal and cultural
traditions’.37
Many histories of EIA trace the global spread of EIA to an origin in the US pas-
sage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) at the end of the 1960s.
From these origins in US legislation, scholars document its ‘globalized’ spread (an
apparent reference to EIA’s geographic ubiquity) by citing long lists of countries and
international institutions where EIA laws and practices have emerged. Discussion of
how this ‘globalization’ came about and how EIA operates under globalisation is
often curiously absent.
In looking closely at how scholars describe the spread of EIA beyond the USA,38
one finds a sense of inevitability that implies that EIA was adopted quickly and
broadly because it was, simply put, a good idea. Christopher suggests that the US ex-
perience was ‘noticed by the international community’, resulting in the development
of EIA in one hundred other countries.39 Wiener and Ribeiro attribute the dissemin-
ation beyond the United States to a ‘growing demand around the world for policy
foresight’.40 Notions of ‘common sense’ and ‘inevitability’ also permeate Alzina’s de-
scription of the proliferation of EIA in developing countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean, which attributes the acceptance of EIA to the ‘common sense’ idea
that good planning leads to good decisions, as well as to the fact that ‘developed
countries recognised EIA as an effective tool’.41 The assertion that EIA quickly
spread from one piece of legislation (NEPA) to ‘one hundred examples’ of EIA laws
becomes the template for describing and understanding EIA’s movement in dozens
of articles.42
Also permeating the literature, and implied by the oft-repeated story of EIA’s
rapid expansion from one to one hundred countries, is the sense that EIA’s prolif-
eration involved a singular ‘version’ of law being spread.43 However, the lack of
detailed histories on its spread make this impossible to verify. The narrative, more-
over, obscures the fact that EIA not only differs in its form between different
36 Yang and Percival (n 23) 615.
37 ibid 616.
38 See eg Christopher Barrow, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment: An Introduction, (John Wiley
1997) 170–1.
39 Caleb Christopher, ‘Success by a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in
Addressing Climate Change’ (2008) 9 Vermont J Envtl L 549, 553.
40 Jonathan Wiener and Daniel Ribeiro, ‘Impact Assessment: Diffusion and Integration’ in Francesca
Bignami and David Zaring (eds), Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global Regulatory
Process (Edward Elgar 2016) 159, 159.
41 Alzina (n 34) 10–2.
42 While the source for this number of ‘100 nations’ is often unattributed, it seems to trace to a 1996 study
of EIA by Barry Sadler. Sadler’s exact claim was that, since EIA had been introduced, ‘it is estimated that
more than 100 countries have national EA systems in place’. Sadler (n 33) 25 (emphasis mine).
43 Often the ‘version’ of EIA being spread closely resembles, if not directly mimics, the law of the US. See
eg Jose´ Castaneda, ‘The World Bank Adopts Environmental Impact Assessment’ (1992) 4 Pace YB Int’l
L 241.
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places, but also in the role it occupies between different decision making frame-
works.44 While EIA processes may possess the same name, they work very differ-
ently in different places with different histories and legal cultures.45 This is
powerfully illustrated by recent scholarship on China’s EIA system and demands ‘a
different way of story-telling’.46 The message that EIA was a natural idea whose
time had come de-emphasises the distinctiveness of EIA regimes situated in differ-
ent geographical and institutional locations.
The ‘common sense’ theory of EIA’s spread problematically masks the work of
agents of transmission.47 It thus neglects the fact that EIA has spread because of the
intentional work of institutional ‘evangelizers’.48 A handful of scholars expressly
credit specific institutions, including the United Nations Environment Programme,
the World Bank, the European Union, and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with developing and spreading EIA.49 In
other accounts, the role of these institutions can be deduced from references to insti-
tutional and financial sources of pressure.50 These scholarly contributions hint at
various intentional roll-outs of EIA that have yet to be fully documented and merit
scholarly attention. They suggest the need for legal scholars to populate accounts of
law’s spread with the people advancing this spread, a topic explored in Section 4 of
this article.
2.3 De-contextualised Accounts: Spreading Best Practices
A second dominant narrative that pervades scholarship addressing the spread of EIA
emerges from the fact that much of this scholarship adopts a prescriptive or norma-
tive, rather than descriptive approach, to EIA. This literature seeks to capture ‘best
practices’ of EIA and prescribe ways in which EIA systems can be improved.51 The
44 Craik (n 34) 2.
45 For two useful examples of scholarly work that is attentive to the social and cultural context of EIA, see
Jørn Holm-Hansen, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment in Estonia and Norway’ (1997) 17 EIA Rev 449,
and A Cherp, ‘EA Legislation and Practice in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former USSR: A
Comparative Analysis’ (2001) 21 EIA Rev 335. Recent scholarship has added valuable nuance to this ob-
servation by showing that assessment practices can also differ significantly within jurisdictions as a result
of different training, professional orientations, and disciplinary world views of the professionals active in
impact assessment work. See Richard Morgan and others, ‘Practitioners, Professional Cultures, and
Perceptions of Impact Assessment’ (2012) 32 EIA Rev 11.
46 Yun Ma, ‘Dynamics in Central–Local Division of the Authority of EIA Approval in China’ (2019) 31 JEL
29, 30.
47 Craik (n 34) 2 thus notes that the US was active in ‘promoting the export of EIA as a regulatory model’,
including through the participation of US State Department officials in developing the UNEP Draft
Principles of Conduct.’ Wiener suggests that the process of national diffusion of EIA has been assisted ‘by
the attention given to EIA in international institutions such as UNEP’ as well as references to EIA in
international treaties. Wiener (n 10) 1306.
48 Credit for the term ‘evangelizers’ goes to Craik (n 34) 4.
49 A rare example of this work is Fabrizio de Francesco, Transnational Policy Innovation: The OECD and the
Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis (ECPR Press 2013).
50 Kolhoff and others (n 25) 126 (noting these sources of institutional and financial support for EIA).
51 The rhetorical device of ‘lessons learned’ is frequently adopted for these purposes. See eg Jiri Dusik and
Barry Sadler, ‘Reforming Strategic Environmental Assessment Systems: Lessons from Central and
Eastern Europe’ (2004) 22 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 89, 92.
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significance of this approach, for our purposes, manifests in the fact that EIA is con-
ceived in this literature as a ‘tool’ that can be seamlessly transported from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, and context to context.52 This is emphasised by the prevalent lan-
guage calling for the isolation of ‘best practices’ and ‘models’. This contemplation of
EIA as a legal technique or technology that divorces it from its legal and institutional
origins serves to exaggerate transferability.
Current studies of EIA are particularly motivated by a quest for examples of ‘suc-
cessful models’ capable of replication.53 Sadler’s frequently cited study thus searches
for ‘examples of excellence’ and guidelines for ‘sound practice’.54 Development bank
and development agency financed studies frequently adopt a comparative approach,
surveying the state of practice of EIA in a number of different countries at once,
while identifying areas for improvement.55 Curiously, this work does not explore the
possibility of links between the current dysfunctions of EIA that are explored in sub-
section 2.4 below, and the ways in which EIA was initially introduced to specific
countries, whether imported or imposed.
Such scholarship also reveals the significant ways in which scholars contribute to
the transnational dissemination of knowledge and ideas about EIA law and practice.
In particular, scholars often approach writing about EIA through the lens of ‘effect-
iveness’ studies.56 This invites a ‘spotlighting’ of certain well-worn examples of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful EIA models. It reinforces a tendency in the literature to
de-contextualise EIA law and to reduce such law to a management technique capable
of seamless transmission to other jurisdictions, and contexts.
2.4 Ahistorical Accounts: Implementation Failures
A third narrative pervading the scholarship on EIA’s spread contrasts the exhilarating
‘explosion’ of EIA with the reality of widespread disappointment from implementa-
tion failures.57 A rich scholarly literature now documents the failure of EIA to ‘take
hold’ in many jurisdictions. Ogunba discusses the Nigerian context, in which EIA
practices drew upon North American and British models, having produced distinct
and independent EIA processes that failed to be effectively integrated.58 Similarly,
52 Indeed, the concept of ‘law as tools’ (transposable or not) is particularly prevalent in environmental law
literatures. For a problematization of the use of this metaphor, see Natasha Affolder, ‘Beyond Law as
Tools: Foreign Investment Projects and the Contractualisation of Environmental Protection’ in Pierre
Marie Dupuy and Jorge Vi~nuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection
(CUP 2013) 355, 358.
53 See Cherp (n 45) 335; A Chaker and others, ‘A Review of Strategic Environmental Assessment in 12
Selected Countries’ (2006) 26 EIA Rev 15.
54 Sadler (n 33) 4.
55 See eg Dieudonne´ Bitondo, Reinoud Post and Gwen Van Boven, Evolution of Environmental Impact
Assessment Systems in Central Africa: The Role of National Professional Associations (Netherlands
Commission for Environmental Assessment 2014).
56 On the prevalence of studying EIA through the lens of ‘effectiveness’, see Stephen Jay and others,
‘Environmental Impact Assessment: Retrospect and Prospect’ (2007) 27 EA Rev 287, 290.
57 See eg Chung-Lin Chen, ‘Institutional Roles of Political Processes, Expert Governance, and Judicial
Review in Environmental Impact Assessment: A Theoretical Framework and a Case Study of Taiwan’
(2014) 54 Nat Res J 41.
58 Olusegun Ogunba, ‘EIA Systems in Nigeria: Evolution, Current Practice and Shortcomings’ (2004) 24
EIA Rev 643, 648–9.
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EIA in Ethiopia is described as plagued not only by the weak capacity of enacting
authorities, but also by a perception that the institution is too expensive for that
African nation, and is thus hindering the country’s development.59
Much of the literature on EIA in Africa focuses on ‘failures’.60 A recent study of
EIA in Central African countries concluded the key weaknesses affecting EIA in this
region to be ‘the inadequacy of the implementation laws, standards, and directives’.61
But only rarely is a causal path isolated, and the history of the introduction of EIA in
a country linked to its current diagnosis of implementation failure.62 Historicised
accounts of EIA’s adoption, spread, and evolution are needed to evaluate the sort of
claims that are beginning to circulate and which offer opportunities to connect origin
stories with failed practices. These claims suggest that EIA ‘meets its objectives pre-
dominantly in Western democratic countries . . . [as] copying Western systems does
not work and is even counterproductive’.63 They suggest the fact that EIA was ‘con-
ceived in and for a developed Western situation’ matters in explaining the mixed
results of its transfer into very different countries.64 Yet detailed place-based histories
of EIA’s emergence and spread have yet to emerge that might provide an empirical
backing for these claims.
A final consequence of adopting largely ahistorical and under-contextualised
approaches to tracing the dynamics of EIA’s spread is that what is seen to be trans-
ferred is ‘the system’ of EIA unencumbered by an ‘informed critique of the system’.
Thus, though Canadian EIA processes have inspired developments in Nigeria,65 this
cross-border communication of legal ideas neglects to acknowledge the fact that
Canadians themselves remain sufficiently skeptical of their own processes that
Canada has just announced a major overhaul of its own approach to environmental
assessment.66
59 Adugna Feyissa Gubena, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment in Ethiopia: A General Review of History,
Transformation and Challenges Hindering Full Implementation’ (2016) 6 J Envtl Earth Sci 1, 7.
60 Habib Alshuwaikhat, ‘Strategic Environmental Assessment Can Help Environmental Impact Assessment
Failures in Developing Countries’ (2005) 25 EIA Rev 307, 311–2.
61 Bitondo, Post and Van Boven (n 55) 117.
62 One such exception is Tomoszkova’s study on the Czech Republic, tracing the impetus for EIA to the
particular allure of EU membership. Veronika Tomoszkova, ‘Implementation of the EU Directive on
Environmental Assessment in the Czech Republic: How Long Can the Wolf Be Tricked?’ (2015) 6 Wash
& Lee J Energy, Climate & Envt 451, 453.
63 Kolhoff and others (n 25) 136.
64 Holm-Hansen (n 45) 449.
65 Ogunba (n 58) references Canadian experience as inspiration for the quick implementation of Nigerian
legislation at 649, and employs an evaluative framework based on Canada at 645–6.
66 Minister of Environment and Climate Change, ‘Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act
and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to Make
Consequential Amendments to Other Acts’ (Bill in First Reading, Canadian House of Commons, 8
February 2018) <http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-69/first-reading> accessed 20
March 2019. See generally Jocelyn Stacey, ‘The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law
Implications of Harper’s Environmental Assessment Legacy’ (2016) 21 Review of Constitutional Studies
165.
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3 . CONTAGIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL LAWMAKING
The above exercise of fine-grained sifting through the specific narratives that shape
discourses of EIA spread is intended to foreshadow the tricky terrain that scholarship
on contagious lawmaking inhabits. Ahistorical, de-contextualised and passive accounts
of law’s movements represent but a few of the ‘traps’ around which accounts of legal
mobility in the broader literature must navigate. Before more fully exploring such
traps, and with a base for thinking about environmental law’s movements now estab-
lished through the example of EIA, this article turns to the challenge of naming the
complex processes of movement of legal ideas. This section thus situates scholarly
labels for describing environmental law’s movements within their wider intellectual his-
tory and seeks to make a case for what the concept of ‘contagious lawmaking’ might
add to such existing metaphor-rich intellectual traditions.
3.1 The Revealing Nature of the Terminological Disarray
Although the fact that law is ‘on the move’ has been noted by many scholars, the trend
in the literature has been for scholars to approach this phenomenon in different ways,
using different vocabularies, and employing different methodologies to study it. This is
evident in the way that the spread of EIA has been cited as evidence of the emergence
of global environmental law,67 of transplantation,68 of diffusion and integration.69 The
lack of an agreed-upon nomenclature for discussing law’s movements creates a risk
that scholars are talking past each other rather than benefitting from each other’s
work.70 It equally prevents legal scholars from demonstrating the value of legal analysis
to complement the dominant tools of and lenses from policy diffusion studies. As sug-
gested above, terminologies of diffusion and dissemination can re-direct the focus of in-
quiry away from individual people, by centring processes and flows. Terminological
choices can also privilege a view of law as transportable, as concerning ‘abstract rights
possessed by rather disembodied legal subjects’, and in the process de-emphasise the
specificity and particularity of local contexts.71
Before examining some of the terms used to capture the ‘spread’ of environmental
law ideas, it is important to understand why it is legal ideas that are being tracked
here, and not law. As I discuss in more detail in Section 4, the attempt to understand
environmental law’s movements is contaminated and impeded by false claims of uni-
versalism that conflate different manifestations of legal ideas. In these processes, cer-
tain abstract labels are used to suggest that a singular version of ‘law’ is being
67 Yang and Percival (n 23).
68 Louis Kotze and Caiphas Soyapi, ‘Transnational Environmental Law: The Birth of a Contemporary
Analytical Perspective’ in Douglas Fisher (ed), Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 82, 94.
69 Wiener and Ribiero (n 40) 159.
70 In legal scholarship, those tracking the transnational flows of environmental law ideas do so within dis-
tinct literatures—capturing these phenomena as extraterritorial lawmaking, as international law, as com-
parative law, as ‘rule of law’ promotion, as transnational governance, as comparative constitutional law, as
transnational legal orders, as law and globalisation. Outside law, these ideas are explored by, among
others, constructivist international relations scholars (contemplating the movement of norms through
‘epistemic communities’), political scientists, and sociologists (contributing understandings of norm so-
cialization and the significance of social movements).
71 See Valverde (n 30) 109–10.
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transported.72 Such abstractions allow certain concepts to go by the same name
when they are, in fact, quite distinct. Law is challenging to disentangle from legal cul-
ture, and what is ‘on the move’ may simply be an idea assumed to represent a certain
version of law.73 Framing these movements in terms of legal ideas allows one to ap-
proach their study with greater humility, and, perhaps, to be more alert towards the
complicated reality of what is actually in motion. Adopting a lens that foregrounds
the movement of legal ideas may also help reveal the importance of starting points in
studies of law’s movements. Does one begin with a universal idea and trace how it is
vernacularised in different local settings?74 Or, instead, is the starting point the local
manifestation and the research challenge one of understanding how and why that
particular version is such a let-down compared to the idealised model?75
There is no agreed-upon vocabulary to describe border-crossing interactions by
which similar legal ideas develop in different spatial and political locations. The fact
that a single term effectively capturing this phenomenon fails to emerge is in itself re-
vealing. It suggests that scholars are perhaps talking about different things when they
use the same words. Others may also be using different words to describe the same
things. The absence of a satisfactory label is itself suggestive of the messy, boundary-
lacking, and less-than-fully-developed nature of this subject. What insights emerge
from thinking about why existing labels are less than satisfactory?
First, something needs to be said about the terminology of transplants, which con-
tinues, despite mounting critique, to be adopted by legal scholars.76 While the trans-
plant metaphor has been aptly criticised as ‘too crude’77 and inadequate,78 it has
proven to be extraordinarily resilient. Thus, while scholars increasingly caution
against a ‘simplistic view of legal transplantation of norms’,79 the terminology contin-
ues to be readily adopted.80 The consequence of the continued widespread use of
the transplant metaphor is a restricted visual field that prevents the scholarly gaze
from moving much beyond two snapshot images: the uprooting of law from one na-
tional context and its resowing in another.
The ‘transplant’ mindset thus tends to trap understandings of law’s diffusion
within a positivist framework. It restricts thinking about legal diffusion to a
72 For a concrete manifestation of this practice, ‘precaution spotting’, see Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Precaution,
Precaution Everywhere: Developing a “Common Understanding” of the Precautionary Principle in the
European Community’ (2002) 9 MJ 1, 7.
73 Recent scholarship on topics as varied as environmental law principles and emissions trading systems
warns against claims of universality and culturally neutral transposition. See Scotford (n 19) and
Bogojevic (n 14).
74 See eg Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence (University of Chicago Press 2006) 134.
75 See eg Ma (n 46).
76 See eg Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2 edn, U Georgia P 1993).
77 Annelise Riles, ‘Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 802.
78 Maximo Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 Harv Int’l LJ 2, 29.
79 Scotford (n 19) 56–7.
80 Wiener (n 10); Jonathan Miller, ‘A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and
the Argentine Example to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51 AJCL 839; Sean Whittaker, ‘The
Right of Access to Environmental Information and Legal Transplant Theory: Lessons from London and
Beijing’ (2017) 6 TEL 509.
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discussion of primarily doctrine-infused transfers of laws, institutions and legal
ideas. The limitations of such a mindset, and its accompanying framework for ana-
lysing diffusion, are well illuminated in the ‘post-positivist’81 contributions of
William Twining.82 The study of ‘transplants’ often privileges large scale transfers,
such as the movement of entire civil or commercial codes. Such studies have been
less attentive to the ‘pathways and processes of diffusion of particular products,
techniques or ideas’ that socio-legal studies might bring into view.83 The termin-
ology of ‘transplants’ thus risks missing some of the ‘suppler’ aspects of legal
migrations.84
Missed by typical attempts to identify ‘transplants’, and to name ‘donors’ and
‘recipients’, are the more complex migrations of ideas and thoughts that legal plural-
ists seek to illuminate.85 Transfers of non-state law, informal processes, and unofficial
law are neglected. The complex overlaps and interactions of legal norms are
obscured. Thinking of law’s movement in terms of ‘transplants’ also risks erasing
what was there before, implying that transfers fill ‘a vacuum’,86 or treating what previ-
ously existed as non-law.
Given the multiple sites and vectors of travel implicated in the practice of spread-
ing legal ideas, it is possible something is afoot that is both quantitatively and qualita-
tively distinct from what is suggested by the transplant metaphor.87 A hint that this is
the case appears in the way environmental law has been harnessed as an element of
‘rule of law’ reforms, becoming a proxy for good governance claims. Jonathan Miller
thus suggests that: ‘most countries . . . cannot claim good records in areas such as
international human rights, protection of the environment, and anti-corruption efforts
without importing some foreign or international models’.88 Widespread, snowball-
style legal roll-outs are being produced in response to the demands of rule-of-law
agendas. These involve practices of transfer that differ in both magnitude and mech-
anism from those the transplantation metaphor has been developed to describe.89
Despite such limitations, this article does not advocate abandoning the transplant
metaphor, only acknowledging these constraints and their character. The term is
81 Kyle McGee, Bruno Latour: The Normativity of Networks (Routledge 2014) 95.
82 In a pair of essays, William Twining illuminates the contributions of law and social science literatures to
legal diffusion. He maps the problematic assumptions and omissions underlying the ‘paradigm case’ of
legal diffusion, and usefully unpacks some of the biases reproduced by thinking of diffusion through the
model of ‘transplants’. William Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 49 J Legal Plur
1, 3; William Twining, ‘Social Sciences and Diffusion of Law’ (2005) 32 JLS 203.
83 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’, ibid 9.
84 McGee (n 74).
85 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism’ in Roger Cotterrell and Maksymilian Del
Mar (eds), Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across Disciplines (Edward Elgar 2016).
86 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’ (n 83) 35. This links to what Rogers calls more generally the ‘empty vessel
fallacy.’ Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (4 edn, Free Press 1995) 240–2.
87 This is perhaps unsurprising given that many of the paradigmatic scholarly contributions on the possibil-
ity and impossibility of legal transplants drew upon theory, rather than basing their argument on observed
practices of legal change. See Michele Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 442, 442.
88 Miller (n 80) 840 (emphasis mine).
89 The role of the World Bank in such roll-outs of EIA is explored in Section 3.
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valuable because of its intellectual history, and for the debates it has ignited, includ-
ing foundational debates about the relationships between law, society and culture,
and law’s autonomy from its social context.
The terminological problems identified above are not easily resolved by producing
a new term or aligning with a more inclusive metaphor. Terminological re-framings
of legal spread have already been extended to include studies of ‘reception, transplants,
spread, expansion, transfer, exports and imports, imposition, circulation, transmigra-
tion, transposition, and transfrontier mobility of law’.90 In scholarship tracing the
movement of constitutional law ideas, a migration metaphor has become popular.91
The terminology of migration, however, seems to remove the legal subject and to
imply that legal ideas move by themselves. Other terms attempt to capture critical per-
spectives, with the aim of elucidating that the transfer task can be complex, unpredict-
able and sometimes ill-designed. Moving law thus involves ‘legal irritants’92 and
practices of ‘interbreeding’.93
A single, satisfying terminological replacement for ‘transplant’ is ultimately unlike-
ly to emerge because the processes of legal migration invoked by this terminology
are so multiple. Diffusion is the term that is currently favoured in much of both law
and social sciences.94 Diffusion is far from the perfect term, however. It connotes a
dissatisfying sense of passivity, which fails to conjure the entrepreneurship, dyna-
mism and intentional activity that mark ‘diffusive’ practices. It also risks suggesting
that what is being diffused is a singular idea. This may obscure the fact that different
environmental law developments, while appearing related, actually operate quite dif-
ferently and have very different histories. To some significant extent, the scholarship
lacks robust categorisation because the subject defies it.
3.2 The Value of the Contagion Metaphor
In spite of these difficulties, naming and framing the spread of environmental law
ideas is itself a critical practice. Terminology helps make the starting points and
biases associated with the study of environmental law’s spread more transparent.
Thus, I have developed the concept of ‘contagious lawmaking’ in this article as it cre-
ates space for dissecting the multiplicity of processes at work, of directions of travel,
and of levels at which the ‘influence’ of legal ideas can be detected or imagined. My
motivation here is to find a name, even as a place-holder, to describe what I see as a
significant aspect of environmental law practice that my own legal education has not
prepared me to adequately describe. Neither international law, with its dominant
focus on state implementation of international law norms, nor comparative law,
which ‘grew up within a vision of the world as divided into “water tight” legal
90 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’ (n 83) 5.
91 See eg Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2006).
92 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law; or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New
Divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11.
93 Wiener (n 10) 1307.
94 Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons and Geoffrey Garrett, ‘The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social
Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?’ (2007) 33 Ann Rev Soc 449; Erin Graham, Charles
Shipan and Volden Craig, ‘The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research’ (2013) 43 Brit J Poli Sci 673.
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systems’95 provide adequate intellectual roots for this work. I have turned to the lan-
guage of science in an attempt to both see and understand underexplored dimen-
sions of the dispersal of legal ideas. While the terminology of ‘contagion’ has been
used on occasion by political scientists describing the transnational ‘contagion’ of
military coups96 and patterns of urban disorder in the US during the 1960s,97 its po-
tential explanatory power in the context of transnational lawmaking has not previous-
ly been explored.98
‘Contagion’ connotes a multiplicity of vectors and directions of travel that ‘diffu-
sion’ does not. It also implicates the internal status of both the original host and the
contracting host in relation to the transferred substance, as well as the environment
in which they interact. In the context of transnational lawmaking, it thus implicates
the histories and sociopolitical realities of the places and peoples involved in a given
policy transfer, as well as the global institutional and economic power structures that
define the transfer environment. This understanding of policy movement directs
focus away from the substance that is moving (the focus of the ‘diffusion’ metaphor)
and towards the complex variables that ultimately determine the manner in which a
legal idea takes hold and operates. It also suggests the possibility that local factors
may cause legal ideas to ‘mutate’ in unforeseen ways, and have unpredictable
impacts. It thus necessarily engages a consideration of factors that tend to hide in the
methodological ‘blind spots’ that will be identified in Section 4 of this article.
Furthermore, ‘contagion’ does a more satisfying job of encompassing the breadth
of theorised transfer mechanisms than more passive metaphors. The dominant
mechanisms discussed in the scholarship include social construction, coercion, com-
petition and learning.99 By implicating deliberate, dynamic and interactive processes,
these mechanisms demand focus on the interests and characteristics of the agents
involved in policy movement. Thus, similar to the contagion metaphor, these theor-
etical approaches discourage excessive focus on the transferred policy itself, and dir-
ect it towards vectors and variables that better represent the complex multi-
directional ‘informational network’ that defines the international system.100
Contagious outbreaks are complex, often defy understanding, and occur even ab-
sent known agents of transmission. The metaphor of contagions, like Teubner’s lan-
guage of ‘legal irritants’, bring to the surface the problematic aspects of uncritical
approaches to the spread of environmental law ideas.101 Contagious lawmaking is far
from a definitive label. That is, however, perhaps useful. That the term is both jarring
and unfamiliar serves as a reminder of the value in problematising terminology and
95 Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Globalization and Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard
Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 579, 579.
96 Richard Li and William Thompson, ‘The “Coup Contagion” Hypothesis’ (1975) 19 J Confl Resolution
63.
97 Manus Midlarsky, ‘Analyzing Diffusion and Contagion Effects: The Urban Disorders of the 1960s’
(1978) 72 Am Pol Sci Rev 996.
98 The ‘contagion’ metaphor has also been used to help explain how changes in societal behaviors occur.
See Damon Centola, How Behaviour Spreads: The Science of Complex Contagions (Princeton 2018).
99 Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett (n 94).
100 David Lazer, ‘Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International System as an
Informational Network’ (2005) 598 Annals Am Academy of Pol & Social Sci 52.
101 Teubner (n 92).
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speaks to the conceptually challenging nature of what needs to be labelled. In
describing something that is complex and multi-faceted, I have been eager not to
erase the complexity and messiness that surround the practices being described, but
rather to illuminate that complexity and confusion. This, of course, exposes me to
the critique of mounting an untidy argument, and of adopting imprecise terminology.
Both of these critiques have merit. Contagious lawmaking reminds us that legal ideas
are spreading, leaking and infecting in ways that are still poorly understood.
4. CONTAGIOUS LAWMAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SCHOLARSHIP: FIVE TRAPS FOR THE WARY
One of the intentions of grounding this engagement with terminology and method-
ology in a concrete example—a study of discourses surrounding the spread of envir-
onmental impact assessment—is to offer a rich site for exploring the significant
hurdles and challenges implicated by the study of the movement of environmental
law in what is inherently a comparative and transnational space. The necessarily com-
parativist project of understanding the practices of contagious lawmaking demands
methodological introspection and engages concerns about terminology, categorisa-
tion, and scale of comparison that have occupied comparative law scholars for
years.102
The methodological observations that follow emerge from the view that facts,
events, vocabularies, outcomes, processes and people can all be erased by meth-
odological choices and starting points. The importance of starting points is high-
lighted by recent scholarship that reveals how ‘transnational’ inquiries,
investigations that privilege physical space, tend to de-emphasise temporality and
to hide colonial encounters that happen in contexts other than physical spaces,
such as economic contexts.103 Critical awareness of methodological choices is par-
ticularly valuable to transnational law research that involves stepping out of one’s
own legal culture and finding and labelling legal developments in less familiar
places.104
Moving beyond description, this article problematises scholarly practices of en-
gagement with contagious lawmaking through the mapping of five particular ‘traps’.
Precisely because environmental law scholarship has not been traditionally domi-
nated by methodological scepticism, there is value in identifying how issues of
method ‘remain inseparable from those concerning the politics and the “project” of
any comparative undertaking’.105 These ‘traps’ are significantly interrelated—the
quest for policy relevance may lead to practices that de-contextualise and ignore his-
tory given the urgency of finding transportable ‘solutions’ to environmental
102 Annelise Riles, ‘Introduction: The Projects of Comparison’ in Annelise Riles (ed), Rethinking the Masters
of Comparative Law (Hart 2001) 2.
103 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Robert Young, ‘Neocolonialism and the Secret Agent of Knowledge’
(1991) 13 Ox Lit Rev 220; Valverde (n 30) 112–13.
104 This article nudges along the project of promoting frank and self-critical methodological awareness and
debate in environmental law scholarship. See Elizabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturing and Methodology:
Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213.
105 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a Critique
of Global Governance’ in Maurice Adams and Jacob Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative
Law (CUP 2012) 186, 188.
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problems. Obscuring the identity of key agents disseminating environmental law
ideas transnationally may be a consequence of the fact that the individual writing
about dissemination is the same person moving legal ideas, or writing judgments, or
advocating for legal reform across jurisdictions.
This section is structured around five ‘traps for the wary’. They are called such be-
cause these methodological landmines do not only lie in wait for those unaware of
such risks. Rather, these are traps that scholars are aware of and still struggle to avoid.
Making these risks explicit, as I do here, invites discussion and awareness of these
challenges, even if it cannot make them go away.
4.1 Disguised Policy Agendas
As much of the intellectual work on EIA reveals, environmental law scholars deeply
intermingle their normative and descriptive projects. This is not to suggest that em-
pirical projects are somehow not normative, or that scholarly literature framing itself
as description is not simply hiding its ambitions for prescription.106 Rather, the point
is that, in analysing scholarship on contagious lawmaking as a whole, it is possible to
identify a dominant compulsion to advance a particular ‘project’ of environmental
law, to promote legal reform in a particular direction, or to encourage further and
widespread adoption of a specific legal development.
This can be seen, first, through the intentional selection of specific vocabularies
and rhetorical devices to describe legal developments.107 Gift-wrapping law in the
ideologically neutral language of ‘best practices’ or ‘successful models’ (language that
dominates narratives on the spread of EIA) may facilitate and encourage transfer and
uptake. While scholars have particularly directed this charge against those disguising
neo-liberal agendas within law reform prototypes,108 this is an ideologically ecumen-
ical practice—‘deep green’ agendas can also be packaged using the neutral language
of ‘successful’ or ‘best’ practices.
Literature on the spread of environmental courts provides a further example of
the widespread use of this ‘best practices’ framing. Significant scholarly work on
green courts describes the ‘explosion’ of green courts in terms that advocate for fur-
ther dissemination of a particular vision of such courts.109 The very fact that these
legal developments have been successfully adopted in other jurisdictions and by
106 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘De´crire et Prescrire: Note sur les Conditions de Possibilite´ et les Limites de l’Efficacite´
Politique’ (1981) 38 Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 69.
107 The widespread use of the language of innovation described in the previous section on EIA is one such
example.
108 Tom Bu¨hrs, ‘From Diffusion to Defusion: The Roots and Effects of Environmental Innovation in New
Zealand’ (2003) 12 Envtl Poli 83, 84.
109 See eg the pioneering study of George and Catherine Pring on environmental courts and tribunals that
pivots around a search for identifying ‘best practices’. This study, identifying 350 specialized environ-
mental courts and tribunals, involved extensive field work and interviews to identify the ‘building blocks’
of effective courts and tribunals. This influential study is framed within a literature and an advocacy
movement on access to justice. Although decision points are framed as requiring some tailoring based
on the particular circumstances of local jurisdictions, there is a fairly clear subtext here on the contents
and parameters of ‘what counts’ as an inaccessible or accessible court. George Pring and Catherine
Pring, Greening Justice: Creating and Improving Environmental Courts and Tribunals (Access Initiative
2009) 11, Figure 2.
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other institutions is thus used as a rhetorical device in advocating for further dissem-
ination. The ‘global dissemination’ argument thus features prominently in domestic
law reform submissions.110
Bu¨hrs offers a useful critical reading of the ways in which three of New Zealand’s
environmental law ‘innovations’—the Resource Management Act, the Individually
Transferable Quota management system for fisheries, and the Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment—have served as models for emulation outside
New Zealand.111 He argues that the language of ‘lessons’ and ‘learning’ from these
models obscures the neo-liberal ideology underlying their creation, and the politics
at stake.112 This instrumentalism and resulting de-politicisation are reinforced by the
fact that ‘borrowing’ is often treated as an aspect of ‘improvement’ or convergence
with international standards in environmental law scholarship.
Thinking about the prescriptive focus of much environmental law scholarship, as
well as its embeddedness in advocacy projects, promotes renewed attention to the
value of self-awareness. This includes alertness to the particular project being
advanced and to the relationship between that project and its methods. It also pro-
motes deliberate consideration of the possibility of alternative methodologies. Anne
Orford thoughtfully develops this point in her article ‘In Praise of Description.’ She
notes how ‘the turn to description also offered a means of countering the tendency
of the dominant mode of critique to flatten everything, so that the world and all the
people in it turned out to be describable in terms of an extremely limited set of char-
acteristics’.113 This ‘flattening’ creeps into work that attempts to describe legal devel-
opments emerging in distinct places, and increases the risk of erasing the
particularities of place, history, and Indigeneity.
4.2 Ignoring History
Detailed histories of the production and circulation of relevant legal practices are ab-
sent in most areas of environmental law just as they are for EIA. However, the few
well documented examples of environmental law developing through colonial impos-
ition, international financial institution-mediated mandate, and misguided legal
‘transplantation’ illustrate why tracing ‘missing histories’ is a particularly urgent task
for environmental law scholars. They also underline the particular value of recent
contributions by scholars whose work carefully elucidates the historical development
of environmental law ideas.114
110 See, eg David Boyd, ‘Bill C-469: The Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights’ (Brief prepared for the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development 27 October
2010) <http://davidrichardboyd.com/wp-content/uploads/Bill-C-469-brief-in-English.pdf> accessed
20 March 2019 (citing global examples of constitutionalised rights in submissions advocating for an en-
vironmental right in Canada).
111 Bu¨hrs (n 108) 84.
112 ibid.
113 Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 25 LJIL 609, 622.
114 Joshua Gellers, for example, draws out examples of the constraining role that international norms occupy
in domestic constitution drafting processes, which serve to ‘socialize’ countries into including environ-
mental rights in their constitutions. He does so in careful field-based study of environmental rights in
Nepal and Sri Lanka. Joshua Gellers, The Global Emergence of Constitutional Environmental Rights
(Routledge 2017) 2.
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This need for attentiveness to the particular histories of environmental law devel-
opments that are the subject of ‘contagious lawmaking’ narratives becomes most ap-
parent when one considers the consequences of circulating ahistorical
understandings of environmental law’s development. For example, the privileging of
‘snapshot’ accounts over more complex, temporal and historical analyses promotes a
‘normative managerialism’ evident in EIA promotion efforts that tether EIA to the
managerial concepts of objectivity, rationality, and utility.115 EIA processes thus be-
come judged based on whether they achieve performative norms, with the effect of
down-playing the ways in which EIAs are the product of both place and politics.116
Snapshot views of EIA regimes that emphasise implementation ‘failure’ may ob-
scure the fact that it can be intentional politics that underlie weak EIA systems. Such
politics are brought into the foreground by Bravante and Holden in their analysis of
EIA in the Philippines:
The shortcomings of the EIA system are not an oversight, or a result of faulty
judgment, rather they reflect a policy direction shaped by those with a vested
interest in the continued mismanagement of natural resources (Broad 1995).
This is not a demonstration of policy failure; it is a demonstration of political
success in managing natural resources for the benefit of those who control the
state. . . the problem is not the absence of political will to implement a more
meaningful EIA system; rather, the problem is the presence of political will rep-
resenting elite interests (Broad 1995).117
Equally concealed in ahistorical accounts of environmental law’s circulation are the
dominant myths and assumptions embedded in the act of creating law for export.
While increasing attention is being paid to the EU as an exporter of legal norms,118
less attention is being directed to the needs of local law-importing communities.
Postcolonial tendencies to consider forms of Western law as the only worthy sources
of inspiration and replication persist, often unnoticed.119 Today’s ‘idealistic exporters’
of law may employ ‘unconscious attitudes’ of universalism that avoid looking behind
the ‘good ideas’, and thus unwittingly privilege certain ideals over others.120 Thus,
ahistorical narrations of environmental law serve the purpose of making ‘cut and
115 For a development of this critique that extends the argument to ecological training more generally, see
Timothy Luke, ‘Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation’ in Frank
Fisher and Maarten Hajer (eds), Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse (1999)
103.
116 See Richard Morgan, ‘Environment Impact Assessment: The State of the Art’ (2012) 30 Impact
Assessment and Project Appraisal 5, 7.
117 Meriam Bravante and William Holden, ‘Going through the Motions: The Environmental Impact
Assessment of Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Projects in the Philippines’ (2009) 22 Pacific Rev 523, 542.
118 See eg Joanne Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction’ (2009) 57 AJCL 897.
119 With the consequence, for example, of ignoring customary law and Indigenous law as a source of envir-
onmental wisdom. Saskia Vermeylen, ‘Comparative Environmental Law and Orientalism: Reading be-
yond the “Test” of Traditional Knowledge Protection’ (2015) 24 RECIEL 304.
120 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, ‘Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy’ in Yves Dezalay and Bryant
Garth (eds), Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importance of a New Legal Orthodoxy
(University of Michigan Press 2002) 320.
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paste’ methodologies of legal diffusion feel less odious by ignoring the challenging,
yet vital, complexity of historical accounts.
What histories are needed and what models are on offer? Importantly, environ-
mental law scholars are uncovering the loaded agendas of historical and ongoing co-
lonial legal transplants.121 They are also advancing the understanding of global
phenomena such as environmental rights’ constitutionalisation, using field work to
elucidate, in a deeply contextualised way, legal processes in particular places.122
Their work adds to the insights of multi-sited ethnographic studies. It provides meth-
odological inspiration for legal scholars eager to better illuminate the transnational
flows of legal ideas.123
Despite the general framing of universalism as permeating the literatures on glo-
bal circulation of environmental law ‘innovations’, certain subtle messages do impli-
citly run counter to that dominant structure. In these messages, the influence of the
‘international’ or the ‘foreign’ on domestic environmental law succumbs to differen-
tial narratives depending on whether the ‘receiving’ nations might be thought of as
developed or less developed countries. Writing on EIA diffusion, Hironaka thus sug-
gests that ‘the international system is often the primary motivator of environmental
protection policies in less developed countries.’124
Disparate treatments of different parts of the world are also evident in the un-
evenness of the scholarly coverage of ‘directions of travel.’ It is easy to find examples
of legal borrowings from European environmental law. Thus, we know that the EU
E-Waste directives were influential in China,125 and that the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme has been used as a model for Kazakhstan and influenced China’s emissions
trading policy.126 The international reach of the EU Regulation on Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) is both acknowl-
edged127 and contested, respectively, by scholars.128
Discursive privileging of the ‘developed world’ obscures the fact that flows of
environmental law ideas and ‘innovations’ move not only in a North-South direc-
tion, but in the opposite and other directions as well.129 We can see these other
121 See, eg Mario Prost and Yoriko Otomo, ‘British Influences on International Environmental Law: The
Case of Wildlife Conservation’ in Robert McCorquodale and Jean-Pierre Gauci (eds), British Influences
on International Law, 1915-2015 (Brill Nijhoff 2016).
122 See Gellers (n 114).
123 Carol A Heimer and Jaimie Morse, ‘Colonizing the Clinic: The Adventures of Law in HIV Treatment
and Research’ in Heinz Klug and Sally Engle Merry, The New Legal Realism: Studying Law Globally.
Volume II (CUP 2016).
124 Ann Hironaka, ‘The Globalization of Environmental Protection: The Case of Environmental Impact
Assessment’ (2002) 43 Intl J Comp Soc 65, 65 (emphasis mine).
125 Xin Tong and Lin Yan, ‘From Legal Transplants to Sustainable Transition: Extended Producer
Responsibility in Chinese Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Management’ (2013) 17 J
Industrial Ecology 199.
126 Anatole Boute, ‘The Impossible Transplant of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Challenge of
Energy Market Regulation’ (2017) 6 TEL 59, 60–1.
127 Scott (n 106).
128 Dirk Heyen, ‘Influence of the EU Chemicals Regulation on the US Policy Reform Debate: Is a
“California Effect” Within REACH?’ (2013) 2 TEL 95.
129 For a thoughtful challenge to the ‘Americanization’ thesis see Toby Goldbach, Peter Katzenstein and
Benjamin Brake, ‘The Movement of U.S. Criminal and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting
and Translating’ (2013) 20 Indiana J of Global Legal Studies 141.
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directions in the judicial citation practices of leading courts, including Australian
and Canada courts.130 Explicit judicial citation is far from the only indicator of the
intellectual influence of the global South on the environmental law and legal proc-
esses of the global North. Scholars are illuminating, for example, the way in which
Indian and South Asian courts have acted as trailblazers in advancing environmen-
tal law developments including rights’ protection paradigms.131 Judges similarly
show an alertness to the influence of non-Western examples in their scholarly writ-
ings.132 Thus, while it is easy to succumb to the power of dominant narratives’ pic-
ture of one-way flows of ideas and influence, alternative accounts can and must be
explored.
4.3 Risks of ‘False Universalism’ and Misappropriating Indigeneity
A challenge that permeates scholarly attempts to draw attention to the presence of
similar legal concepts in different spaces is seeing universalism, or perceiving conver-
gence, where legal ideas and concepts might in fact be quite distinct on the ground.
At this more fine-grained level of analysis, legal ideas that are treated as categorically
equivalent may reveal themselves to be products of specific legal histories and cul-
tures. This challenge relates directly to the point made earlier about the link between
descriptive work and advocacy because false universalisms are, perhaps often, pro-
duced deliberately if unknowingly. The very use of universalism or convergence as
terminology may be an intended part of a rhetorical strategy to imply that the move-
ment of a particular legal development is unstoppable.
One issue of methodology that universalisms raise is that of language. Language
serves both as a practical obstruction within research projects, and as a limitation
on the flow of ideas between scholars. Projects mapping the movement of legal con-
cepts across jurisdictions must consider how well the concepts transcend transla-
tion efforts. For example, such analysis is vital when studying how foreign rules
have been translated into Chinese and subsequently formed the basis for Chinese
laws.133 Scholars, including Marina Timoteo, reference the fact that German law
was a significant basis for China’s 2009 Tort Law provisions on environmental li-
ability, yet these rules were inaccurately translated from German into the Chinese
language.134 An interesting question, given the larger argument here, is what
amounts to an ‘inaccurate translation’. While Timoteo’s critique of the translation
130 For example, the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, in Australia, has considered the
opinions of the Supreme Court of India, as well as the High Court of Kenya, in elaborating the polluter
pays principle: Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation, [2006]
NSWLEC 419 [232]. The Supreme Court of Canada also referenced their colleagues in the Supreme
Court of India when first giving significant consideration to the precautionary principle in 114957
Canada Lte´e (Spraytech, Socie´te´ d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 SCR 241 [32].
131 See Michael Anderson, ‘Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India’ in Alan Boyle and
Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 1998) 199.
132 See Lord Carnwath CVO, ‘Judges and the Common Laws of the Environment – At Home and Abroad’
(2014) 26 JEL 177, 180–1; Meredith Wright, ‘The Vermont Environmental Court’ (2010) 3 J Court
Innovation 201, 203.
133 See Marina Timoteo, ‘Law and Language: Issues Related to Legal Translation and Interpretation of
Chinese Rules on Tortious Liability of Environmental Pollution’ (2015) 4 China-EU LJ 121, 122.
134 ibid 125.
206  Contagious Environmental Lawmaking
of liability concepts into the environmental pollution rules of Chinese Tort Law
focuses on word choice and over-generalisation, there is clearly the potential for
much deeper ‘translation problems’ between the German and Chinese systems at
stake. Timoteo’s scholarship flags the additional layer of complexity, and potential
for misunderstanding, that emerges when English-speakers read ‘Chinese law in
English’.135
Beyond language, the risk I want to draw particular attention to here arises from
recent attempts to emulate developments regarding the ‘rights of nature’. These
rights emerge, above all, from legal recognitions of Indigenous worldviews. The asso-
ciated danger of misappropriating Indigeneity is thus of growing significance for en-
vironmental law, particularly in the wake of recent legislative developments such as
New Zealand’s recognition of Te Awa Tupua (the Whanganui River) as a legal
person.136
Even within a single jurisdiction, the translation of an Indigenous concept into
the public policy of a state involves deliberate and political acts of transformation.137
An erasure of Indigenous law in relation to the rights of nature may occur, for in-
stance, when Indigenous environmental law concepts are equated with and
universalised through Western conceptions of nature. Much of the ‘rights of nature’
movement attempts to incorporate these Indigenous conceptions of environmental
rights within liberal rights structures which promote an understanding of nature as
external to humanity.138 This nature construct, tied to concepts of both environment
and wilderness, risks erasing Indigeneity as a connection to or kinship with the non-
human world.139 Indigenous worldviews often contemplate land and water ‘as intim-
ately related ancestors, not simply physical forms’.140
Linking this argument back to questions of language, Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru
and Tipa suggest that Indigenous knowledges and laws often involve realities and
135 ibid 129.
136 For a thoughtful analysis of the ways in which the grant of legal personality to Te Urewera and the
Whanganui River are ‘deeply embedded in Aotearoa New Zealand’s legal culture’ and aim to regulate
‘human relationships relating to the land and river’ see Katherine Sanders, ‘“Beyond Human
Ownership”: Property, Power, and Legal Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand’ (2018) 30
JEL 207.
137 Saskia Widenhorn, ‘Towards Epistemic Justice with Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledge? Exploring the
Potentials of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Philosophy of Buen Vivir’ (2014) 56 Dev
378, 379.
138 Exceptionally, the Ecuadorian Constitution is cited as an example of the possibility of blending the
Western construct of ‘rights of nature’ and indigenous ‘cosmovisions’. Louis Kotze´ and Paola
Villavicencio Calzadilla, ‘Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental Constitutionalism
and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador’ (2017) 6 TEL 401, 415.
139 Jocelyn Thorpe and Stephanie Rutherford, ‘National Natures in a Globalized World: Climate Change,
Power and the Erasure of the Local’ (2010) 90 Dalhousie Rev 127, 129–30. The Te Awa Tupua Act (n
1) s 13(c) states one aspect of ‘the essence of Te Awa Tupua’ to be an ‘inalienable connection’ between
Maori communities and Te Awa Tupua.
140 Michelle Thompson-Fawcett and Robin Quigg, ‘Identity, Place, and the (Cultural) Wellbeing of
Indigenous Children’ in Christina Ergler, Robin Kearns and Karen Witten (eds), Children’s Health and
Wellbeing in Urban Environments (Routledge 2017) 223, 226.
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imaginaries that are not even describable in the English language.141 It is this categor-
ical difference from hegemonic global norms that makes Indigenous worlds so
powerful as a source of learning. Thus, while false universalisms inflict damage upon
Indigenous peoples, they also hinder scholarly work by allowing scholars to forget
that it is precisely because Indigenous knowledges are ontologically distinct that we
seek to learn from them.142 Acknowledging this distinctiveness fosters awareness of
the dangers in taking control of knowledges and legal orders away from Indigenous
peoples via transnational movement and packaging of Indigenous law constructs. It
also invites an appreciation of the contributions being made by Indigenous scholars
who navigate the ways in which processes of appropriation and universalisation rup-
ture Indigenous law from rights of self-determination.143
4.4 Law’s Anonymous ‘Actors’
The level of careful contextualisation given to legal developments in the Indigenous
scholarship just cited inspires methodologies that take close account of concrete con-
textual circumstances surrounding legal ideas’ emergence and spread. This is an area
in which theoretical literatures from outside law inform explanations of legal diffu-
sion.144 Studies of the agents and entrepreneurs active in moving law from location
to location elucidate the connective tissues between legal developments in different
spaces.
While comparative law scholarship in the ‘transplant’ tradition was preoccupied
with country-level legal transfers, this lens has been significantly widened to acknow-
ledge the diversity of agents of diffusion from ‘colonists, missionaries and merchants,
. . . slaves, refugees, believers, and jurists’,145 to clinical staff,146 lawyers, and other
professionals.147 Linking the movement of law to the movement and actions of peo-
ple engages the realities of the spread of legal ideas through commerce, education
and religion.148
It is, of course, ‘people’, and not just ‘ideas’, that shape patterns of contagious law-
making.149 While the influence of ‘individual people’ rarely becomes the unit of ana-
lysis in environmental law scholarship, individual roles and contributions can be
141 Michelle Thompson-Fawcett, Jacinta Ruru and Gail Tipa, ‘Indigenous Resource Management Plans:
Transporting Non-Indigenous People into the Indigenous World’ (2017) 32 Planning Prac & Res 259,
271.
142 Annette Watson and Orville Huntington, ‘Transgressions of the Man on the Moon: Climate Change,
Indigenous Expertise, and the Posthumanist Ethics of Place and Space’ (2014) 79 GeoJournal 721.
143 Nicolas Wheen and Jacinta Ruru, ‘Providing for Rahui in the Law of Aotearoa New Zealand’ (2011) 120
J Polynesian Soc 169.
144 See eg Louisa Parks and Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach to Norm
Diffusion: The Case of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing’ (2015) 24 RECIEL 353.
145 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’ (n 82) 22.
146 Heimer and Morse (n 123).
147 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (eds), Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice (Routledge
2012).
148 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’ (n 82) 22.
149 Dezalay and Garth, for example, highlight the role of self-interested individual legal actors in migrating
ideas about law and legal institutions from one context to another. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, The
Internationalization of Global Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to Transform Latin
American States (University of Chicago Press 2002); Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (eds), Global
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gleaned from the ‘acknowledgements’ section of new legislation and policy initia-
tives.150 Focus on the influence of ‘people’ emphasises the need for research on fac-
tors shaping those people, including graduate legal education, sources and languages
of instruction, and leading scholarly texts.151
Little is known, for example, about judges’ efforts to influence law and policy as
opinion leaders, network builders, publicists and law reform advocates152—efforts
referred to as off-bench judicial mobilisation153—or about judicial practices of off-
bench resistance.154 However, a strong sense of the common ‘project’ of environ-
mental protection being advanced through the judiciary can be gleaned from articles
like Lord Carnwath’s ‘world tour’ of exceptional environmental law judicial deci-
sions,155 and his celebration of the crucial role that ‘judges for the environment’ have
to play, both individually and collectively.156
Illuminating the ‘people’ involved in environmental law’s diffusion involves
careful parsing of the complex roles and responsibilities that occupy, visibly and
not, a place in the work of individuals. Targets of such analyses include, but cer-
tainly are not limited to, judges, legislative drafters, and scholars. Explicit acknow-
ledgement of individual legislative drafters’ influence on legislation is rare,157 as is
wider study of the processes of legislative drafting that lead to core environmental
law developments. Yet, given the central place of legislative drafting assistance in
programmes of environmental rule of law ‘promotion’ and environmental law
‘modernisation,’ legislative drafters and drafting practices are a valuable area for
new environmental law research.158 Such research can build on the isolated
Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (University of
Michigan Press 2002).
150 For example, the National Environmental Action Programme of Georgia for 2012–2016 thanks ‘inter-
national experts’ for assisting with the resulting Plan, as well as acknowledging financial and technical as-
sistance from the government of the Netherlands. Ministry of Environment Protection of Georgia,
National Environmental Action Programme of Georgia 2012-2016 (Ministry of Environment Protection of
Georgia 2012).
151 These sources are richly examined in Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP 2017)
46–7.
152 For a fascinating study of international judicial education, see Toby Goldbach, ‘From the Court to the
Classroom: Judges’ Work in International Judicial Education and Training’ (2016) 49 Cornell Intl LJ
617.
153 Onur Bakiner, ‘Judges Discover Politics: Sources of Judges’ Off-Bench Mobilization in Turkey’ (2016) 4
J L & Courts 131.
154 Alexei Trochev and Rachel Ellett, ‘Judges and Their Allies: Rethinking Judicial Autonomy Through the
Prism of Off-Bench Resistance’ (2014) 2 J L & Courts 67.
155 Carnwath (n 132) 182.
156 Robert Carnwath, ‘Judges for the Environment: We Have a Crucial Role to Play’ The Guardian
(London, 22 June 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jun/22/judges-environment-lord-
carnwath-rio> accessed 20 March 2019.
157 But see Twining’s acknowledgement of the ‘specific ideas of a British draftsman (David Maxwell Fyfe)’
on the origins of the UK Human Rights Act. Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law’ (n 82) 13.
158 For an example of a substantial investigation into drafting practices in US congressional practice, see
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, ‘Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I’ (2013) 65 Stan L Rev 901.
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existing examples where legislative drafters explicitly acknowledge transnational
influences on their work.159
A focus on environmental law’s ‘people’ also invites closer critical attention to the
roles of scholars, many of whom are active, consciously or not, in the practice of
law’s contagion. Few scholars explicitly investigate the way that scholarship, confer-
ence presentations, and ‘practice’ advance the dissemination of ‘law’ and particular
versions of law. However, some examples of this refreshingly self-conscious writing
do exist.160 For scholars, and others called upon to be ‘rule doctors’161—whether
they are private legal consultants, members of global law firms, staff in NGOs, legal
drafters for hire, or in-house counsel in international financial institutions—there is
also an opportunity here. This involves more self-consciously situating one’s work in
one’s place in the world, being ever-cognizant of the fact that ‘law cannot be consid-
ered merely a matter of technology to be acquired off the shelf as the best or most ef-
ficient practice’.162
Centring the identities of the ‘people’ engaged in transporting legal norms is one
way by which to re-politicise both ‘the legal’ and the very activity of ‘description’.
The ‘practice turn’ in legal scholarship challenges scholars to contemplate the value
of adding description to categories of legal actors, thus better populating theories of
individual and group influence with names and faces.163 Socio-legal scholars are
responding to this turn by using qualitative methods and discourse analysis to illu-
minate not only texts, but also power relationships including those which inform EU
environmental law ‘in action’.164
4.5 Making Money Visible
Funding is a theme that is neglected by legal scholars, and environmental law schol-
ars are no exception. Whether called ‘aid’, ‘rule of law’ promotion, ‘capacity building’,
‘law reform assistance’, ‘development’, ‘market access’, or even ‘cohesion funding’,165
the flow of money is fundamental to understanding how and why law moves.
Interest groups have built on this insight in the USA, entering the ‘business’ of
159 Examples of such acknowledgements include Conseil d’E´tat, E´tudes et Documents du Conseil d’E´tat
(Documentation Franc¸aise 2006) (a report drawing on ‘international best practices’ to reform French
regulatory processes); Larry Parker, Climate Change and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS):
Looking to 2020 (Congressional Research Service 2010) (materials on the EU ETS informing the US le-
gislative process); and Jernej Stritih and Barbara Simonic, ‘Drafting a Climate Change Act: Lessons
Learned’ (2012) 42 Envtl Poli L 46 (documenting Slovenia’s ‘study tour’ of Britain and review of British
legislation to produce climate change legislation).
160 See eg Sol Picciotto, ‘Critical Theory and Practice in International Economic Law and the New Global
Governance’ (2016) 7 Euro Ybk Intl Econ L 3; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 2005) 562.
161 Dezalay and Garth, ‘Global Prescriptions’ (n 149) 1.
162 Dezalay and Garth, ‘The Internationalization of Global Palace Wars’ (n 149) 5.
163 See eg Gra´inne de Bu´rca, ‘Human Rights Experimentalism’ (2017) 111 AJIL 277.
164 See eg Bettina Lange, ‘Researching Discourse and Behaviour as Elements of Law in Action’ in Reza
Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005).
165 On this last element, cohesion funding is explained as a mechanism for creating a territorialised environ-
mental law in the EU. Antonia Layard and Jane Holder, ‘Seeking Spatial and Environmental Justice for
People and Places within the European Union’ in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed), Law and
Ecology: New Environmental Foundations (Routledge 2011) 171–2.
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judicial training by providing ‘free’ judicial training, which brings with it an opportun-
ity to influence judicial decision-making.166 An awareness of money, and its absence,
is also vital to understanding a significant dynamic of the creation of new laws, new
institutions to implement them, and new courts.
Making monetary influence visible may also be critical to explaining apparent ‘im-
plementation’ failures such as those involving EIA in numerous non-OECD coun-
tries. When law crosses borders, it meets novel resource constraints. This reality is
revealed quickly to scholars who move away from texts and employ interview
methodologies.167
The importance of thinking seriously about money thus has methodological
implications for legal scholars. It invites empirical work that might be challeng-
ing to pursue because of the hurdles in gaining access to financial data and by
implicating quantitative methodologies that might be unfamiliar. It also involves
tricky causative relationships between funding and results. But these hurdles are
not insurmountable for legal scholars, and have been successfully crossed by
some law and economics scholarship.168 Given how easy it is to be unwittingly
blind to the influence of funding, despite the fact that funding is so fundamental
to shaping even the research agendas that can be pursued, there seems to be
value even in highlighting the absence or inaccessibility of information on fund-
ing patterns. Such work might build upon efforts by international law scholars
who are working to make visible the ‘background law’ of global markets and
market principles and the significance of the cross-border movement of financial
flows for law.169
5. CONCLUSION: CONTAGIOUS LAWMAKING AS A PROJECT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARS
Dezalay and Garth have elsewhere highlighted the unresolvable paradox of so-
called legal transplants: ‘most of the legal transplants either fail outright or are
largely unsuccessful, yet the process of transplanting continues apace – and has
done so in varying degrees for centuries’.170 Thinking about the particular signifi-
cance of this observation for environmental law scholarship, it is clear that practices
of contagious environmental lawmaking are not about to end, even if our under-
standing of their complexity and potentially problematic nature is only beginning
to develop.
166 Douglas Kendall and Eric Sorkin, ‘Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars are Undermining
Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust’ (2001) 25 Harv Envtl L Rev 405.
167 Resource constraints thus emerge in interviews with environmental court judges and staff as a critical
element in explaining implementation failure of these courts in many countries. See Pring and Pring (n
109).
168 See eg Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis of International Law’ (1999) 24 Yale J
Intl L 1; Takis Tridimas and George Tridimas, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Annulment of
the Tobacco Advertisement Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public Health?’ (2002)
14 EJLE 171.
169 See eg Odette Lienau, ‘Law in Hiding: Market Principles in the Global Legal Order’ (2017) 68 Hastings
LJ 541.
170 Dezalay and Garth, ‘The Internationalization of Global Palace Wars’ (n 149) 246.
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Asking why practices of contagious lawmaking might fail, or might be prone to
failure, invites a line of inquiry that might itself be contagious, and at least instructive
for environmental law scholarship. Scholarship on legal transplants alerts the reader
to the need to explore precise reasons why this kind of lawmaking goes wrong.
Those particular reasons have been generalised into sometimes grandiose critiques
of processes of legal diffusion that are mounted to rebut assertions, for example, that
transplantation is ‘impossible’.171 But is there really a difference in prevalence and de-
gree between transplanted law and other lawmaking processes going wrong? The
task is not to reduce law’s circulation to questions of success or failure,172 but to flag
the very importance of asking these questions.
To date, the somewhat self-contained ‘transplant/diffusion’ literature has a ten-
dency to link its successes and failures to validating the very idea of law’s spread, per-
haps because of the intellectual tradition’s deep scepticism towards the process it
invokes. When we discuss most other kinds of environmental lawmaking, though, we
do not spend so much time parsing out the ‘mine-filled’ nature of choices of scholar-
ly method, the traps that lie in wait for the suspecting and unsuspecting scholar.
Why?
This article seeks to identify that something significant is afoot here. The right
label for it might not yet be found. Contagious lawmaking, with its potentially pejora-
tive connotations, and its lack of familiarity, is a placeholder that signifies that both
tracing law’s movements and struggling to label them are projects worth the atten-
tion of environmental law scholars. The methodological critiques which animate this
article seek to invigorate and energise future scholarship willing to engage with the
reality of an environmental law that is both ‘local and transnational at the same
time’.173
Beyond description, there is an opportunity here to question, ever more thought-
fully, environmental law’s very tradition of borrowing. There is space to contemplate
environmental law’s creation myths and what aspects of environmental law’s birth
and spread are missing from such accounts. For scholars and practitioners alike, this
work invites intentional ‘navel gazing’ and self-awareness around personal and polit-
ical agendas and practices. Contagious environmental lawmaking presents us ultim-
ately with an intellectual challenge—that of imagining ‘export quality’ environmental
law ideas.
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